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Vidrala’s presence in a mature market with stable and predictable cash flows makes for a 
very attractive M&A target
Executive Summary
Company Overview Industry Overview
• Founded in 1965, Vidrala currently has 8 factories spread across 5 countries, 
being a dominant player in the Western European Market and serving 
approximately 1 600 customers
• The management team has created a strong player in the respective 
geographies through several successful M&A transactions
• Vidrala has been showing a stable and predictable cash flow generation and a 
leverageable balance sheet
• Being highly dependent on the respective end 
markets, this industry’s main drivers are population 
growth, urbanization, the sustainability trend and 
the premiumization of the end markets, with the 
latter increasing the penetration rate of glass over 
other packaging options
Investment Rationale
• Following the industry trend and company strengths, M&A 
consolidation creates value by increasing exposure in key 
geographies and diversifying product portfolio
• Using excess cash to develop factories 
in glass net importing countries adds 
more value than deleveraging further
• Leveraging the company’s focus on automation 
and increasing usage of cullet allows to increase 
EBITDA margins of the company
Entry Value Creation (in million €) Exit
• The exit is planned for 2025. Entry multiple, 
acquisition leverage and operating model 
yield the following returns:
• Entry will be priced at 7.5x EBITDA, 
according to the relative valuation. 
Overall, the acquisition of Vidrala and its 
target Zignago Vetro plus banking and 
due diligence fees results in a cost of        
€ 2.67Bn 
• The capital structure is composed by 66% 
of debt and 34% of equity, optimizing 
returns and respecting covenants 
• Management team will represent 10% of 
the institutional investment contributing 




Inst. Investors 2.8x 23.6%
Mang. Team 20.9x 83.7%
• The exit strategies considered most 
suited for the deal are IPO due to deal-
size and Strategic Sale due to potential 






















• Vidrala is a leading producer of glass containers for the
food & beverage industries
• It also provides packaging services such as beverages
filling and logistic activities, which account for less than
10% of revenues
• Sales by product segment in 2019:
• Its strategy is to be the European low-cost producer,
always focused on customers and competitiveness,



















1965 – The company 
was installed in Llodio, 
(Alava – Spain) in 1965
1966 - Creation of 
Vidrierías de Álava S.A. 
Its manufacturing 
activity began in 1966 
with one furnace, two 
machines
1967 – Begins exporting
1977- Beginning of press & 
blow production of light 
bottles makes Vidrala the 
technological leader of 
the national market
1981- Transformation of 
furnaces, generating an 
energy saving of 50%,
maintaining productive 
capacity. Corporate name 
changed to Vidrala S.A.
1985 - Vidrala’s shares were 
launched on the stock 
market
1989 - Crisnova, a 100% 
subsidiary of Vidrala, started 
its activity in Caudete
1998 - Second Crisnova´s
furnace came into 
operation
1995 - Third Aiala’s furnace 
was built up
2001 - Approval of 
the Strategic Plan of 
corporate growth
2003 – Beginning of 
Internationalization 
process: Entry into 
Portuguese market 
with acquisition of 
Ricardo Gallo Vidro de 
Embalagem
2007 – Entry into Belgian 
market through acquisition 
of La Manufacture du Verre
2015 –Entry into UK and 
Ireland markets through 
the acquisition of Encirc 
Limited
2015 –Vidrala becomes 4th
largest European player, 
and offers a complete 
range of services
2017 - Acquisition of a 
new factory in Portugal 
(Santos Barosa)
2019 – Sale of La 
Manufacture du Verre, 
ending the presence in 
the Belgian Market
25,000 tons 130,000 tons 450,000 tons 805,000 tons 950,000 tons 1,600,000 tons 
2005 – Acquisition of a new 
plant in Spain and entry in 
Italian Market through 
acquisition of a factory
1965-1967 1967-1981 1981-1998 1998-2003 2003-2015 2015-2019








Company Overview | Company Profile & History
Sources: Company´s Published Reports
Outreach and sales by region
It currently operates through:
8 factories in 
5 countries, producing 
around 
8 billion containers per year 
Serving 1 600 customers 
and
Retaining 15% of the Western 
European market
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Considering market trends, glass will have an important role in the future of packaging
Glass bottles and containers Market
Global market size (in billion €)
• It is expected to grow at a CAGR of 4.1%
between 2020 and 2025
• Asia pacific is the biggest market , followed by 
Europe, where Germany, France and Russia 
account for a significant part of the revenues
• The market is competitive and increasingly 
concentrated
Main competitors in Western Europe
• The majority of glass packaging consumption is 
made by the alcoholic beverages industry,  with 



































looking for higher 
quality products, 
and do not mind 
paying a premium
Glass allows for 
attractive design 








• Increasing urban population and 
purchasing power
• Growing demand for alcoholic beverages, 
especially for beer
• Growing number of policies to reduce the 
use of plastics
• Increasing wine trade
















Market Overview | Global Glass Bottles and Containers Market
5
Net importers of glass in Eastern Europe and North Africa represent the best opportunities 
for a greenfield expansion
Market Overview | Opportunities
Sources: Trade Map, Statista
Trade balance of the countries allow us to deepen our analysis 
regarding which markets to entry, since it shows us where 
demand is larger than what is being produced by the local 
producers
• In Eastern Europe: Romania and Latvia seem to be the 
regions where there is greater room for more producers 
• Regarding North African countries, there seems to be a lot 
of opportunities: Algeria, Morocco and Libya. However, in 
these countries a thorough analysis regarding political and 

















Europe   
Alcoholic drinks 208 530 3 221 57 215 32 728
CAGR  2019-2023 2.5% 6.5% 4.4% 2.3%
Non-Alcoholic drinks 137 137 18 501 19 400 10 440
CAGR 2019-2023 2.5% 11.5% 6.3% 3.3%
Food 639 913 131 212 323 516 81 077
CAGR 2019-2023 1.9% 8% 2.4% 1.7%
Beauty and personal care 58264 9 861 19 000 6 021
CAGR 2019-2023 1.9% 3.1% 2.7% 2%
OTC Pharmaceuticals 101 533 1 249 3 594 1 278
CAGR 2019-2023 3.7% 2% 3.1% 3.1%
End Markets size (in million €) and growth 
* Does not include Portugal, Spain nor Italy
Why Beauty and Personal care?
Mainly driven by consumer spending, the 
market is growing as beauty products 
increasingly make part of daily routines. High 
growth opportunities, especially for prestige 
and luxury products, account for 25% of 
revenues. In UK, Italy and Spain, where Vidrala
already operates, the share of people that buys 
these products is 28%, 22% and 21%, respectively
People are looking for visually appealing, 
sustainable and more natural products, with a 
packaging that allow them to see its quality
Why Pharmaceuticals?
Increasing consciousness about health and 
access to health care are driving the demand 
for pharmaceuticals up, particularly in middle 
income countries where it is growing at a 
faster pace 
Countries where Vidrala currently operates 
have high access to medicine. Glass is one of 
the main packaging solutions for medicine 
and drugs, allowing the products to keep 
their properties and contributing to 
sustainability
















Glass Trade balance in 2019 (USD thousand)
6
Financial Analysis | Income Statement
M&A Activity is boosting growth and margins
in Million € 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenues 458 474 469 803 774 823 955 1 011
Organic Growth Rate N/A 3.5% (1.0%) 2.3% (3.7%) (3.8%) 16.1% 5.8%
Inorganic Growth Rate N/A 0.0% 0.0% 69.1% 0.0% 10.2% 0.0% 0.0%
COGS (156) (157) (164) (304) (279) (277) (318) (320)
Gross Profit 301 317 304 499 495 546 637 691
Gross Margin (%) 65.8% 66.8% 64.9% 62.2% 64.0% 66.4% 66.7% 68.4%
Employee Expenses (100) (100) (96) (166) (166) (175) (190) (198)
Other Expenses (102) (106) (102) (178) (162) (181) (204) (207)
Other EBITDA 
Adjustments 2 3 1 (3) 5 (1) (2) (25)
Adjusted EBITDA 102 114 107 152 172 190 242 262
EBITDA Margin (%) 22.2% 24.1% 22.8% 18.9% 22.2% 23.1% 25.3% 25.9%
NOPAT 46 58 50 57 75 86 121 135
NOPAT Margin (%) 10.0% 12.2% 10.6% 7.1% 9.6% 10.4% 12.6% 13.4%
in Million € 2018 2019
Revenues 955 1 011
Iberian Peninsula 567 597
UK & Ireland 334 351
Italy 54 63
Rest of European Union – –
in Million € 2018 2019
Other expenses (204) (207)
External Services (46) (45)
Electricity (54) (51)







• Vidrala has been actively participating in M&A by 
acquiring manufacturing sites in strategical locations
• In 2015 Vidrala acquired its UK & Ireland divisions 
which added over € 300M in revenue. Organic growth 
rate was 2.3%
• In 2017 Vidrala completed another acquisition, Santos 
Barosa in Portugal, adding over € 140M in revenue
• In 2019 the Belgium site was sold to Carlyle Group 
Owned, Saverglass
• Vidrala’s strategy focuses on cost optimization and 
product mix diversification
1
• The acquisition of the UK & Ireland divisions hurt 
Vidrala’s margins as these divisions had significantly 
higher costs compared to others. In 2015, UK & 
Ireland had EBITDA margins close to 18% while other 
segments had close to 21%, with the Iberian Peninsula 
being the most profitable at circa 30%. Currently, UK 
has margins closer to 25%
2
• Energy consumption, specifically, electricity and 
natural gas represent one of the largest cost drivers 
as this industry is very energy intensive
• Sales expense refers to storage and transportation 
costs regarding its logistic services, another large 
standalone cost driver
3
• Employee Expenses and External Services (more 
specifically, maintenance and Insurance) are the two 
least variable captions when analysing a fixed vs 
variable cost basis





Sources: Vidrala’s annual reports
Vidrala’s Income statement key captions 2012-2019
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Financial Analysis | Ratio Analysis
Vidrala has the highest ROA among its peers
• The period between 2014 and 2019 shows a declining 
trend in the cash conversion cycle of the firm. The 
component that has contributed more towards this 
trend is the decline in the holding period, meaning 
the firm took less time to sell its inventories. There 
was also an upward trend on the Payable period since 
as the company scales up, it has more bargaining 
power with its suppliers
• Regarding Vidrala´s position compared to its peers, it 
is observed that smaller players like Zignago Vetro and 
Vetropack have the worst cycles
1
• In the last 5 years there was an increase in the Return 
on Assets of the company. This happened due to 
improvements in the efficiency translated in the 
operational margins but also, because of a positive 
trend in the capacity of generating more sales with 
the assets of the company*
• The second graph shows that Vidrala presented in 
2019 the biggest ROA. When looking at the Asset 
turnover, it is seen that the best companies were 
Verallia and Vetropack. However, in the operational 
margin these 2 players are not as good
2
• The Return on Equity also shows an up-warding trend. 
This happened because although there has been a 
deleveraging of the company in the last 3-4 years, the 
increases on Return on Assets more than compensated 
this negative trend in leverage
• Verallia is the player with the lowest return on assets 
and the highest ROE, which is driven by the highest level 
of leverage within its peers
3
*The decline in Asset turnover in 2017 happened due to the 
acquisition of Santos Barosa, since it increased significantly the 
























Vidrala Vetropack Zignago Vetro Verallia
Cash Conversion 
Cycle
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Vidrala Vetropack Zignago Vetro Verallia
Return on Assets Leverage (Net debt/ EBITDA)ROE
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- Vidrala has a leverageable Balance
Sheet with large assets to collateralize
- Vidrala’s strong and predictable cash 
flow generation allow M&A Activity




- Management team has high tenure in 
the company with deep industry 
knowledge
- Focus on operational improvements 
through M&A and it is observable in 
revenue per employee levels
- Two large acquisitions in the past 5 
years with successful integration 
and operational improvement
- Focus on product portfolio 
diversification and margins 
optimization
- General perception of Glass as a safe 
packaging material
- Premiumization of beverages 
increases demand for glass packaging
- Increasing consumer demand for 
environmentally sustainable products
















• Use Vidrala’s high & stable FCF generation and Management 
Team’s experience to acquire targets in strategical geographies 
and diversify product portfolio
• Continue to consolidate the western Europe market position
• Increase of Automation
• Decrease of Sales Expenses
• Increase in usage of recycled glass
• Increase presence and improvement of Vidrala’s division in Italy 
• Increase product portfolio and new end market
Buy-and-Build, Operational improvements and Greenfield development are the  most 
adequate strategies to create value for Vidrala
Greenfield Development
• Building a new plant can 
bring several opportunities 
to grow. Vidrala will be able 
to capture an important 
fraction of the market, 
taking advantage of its 
experience and efficiency to 
outperform current players
• Adrian Curry, Encirc’s
general manager, has 
experience in setting plants 
from scratch and can 
contribute with his expertise
• Savings in energy and COGS will be driven 
by: increase in usage of cullet, increased 
use of renewable sources and possible 
recovery of heat to be re-used in the 
production process (TASIO UE project)
• Continuation of the automation trend, in 
line with company´s investment in R&D, 
in areas such as robotics and big data, 
that until now have translated into the 
highest revenue per employee among 
competitors
Operational Improvements
Investment Thesis | Overview
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Investment Thesis |Buy-and-Build
Plan A consists of acquiring Zignago Vetro, due its product portfolio and strong positioning   
in Western Europe
Acquisition plans
Sources: Vidrala, Zignago Vetro, Vetropack, Eurovetro, Google Maps Notes: *Company profile in the appendix
Plan A – Zignago Vetro Plan B – Vetropack Why Zignago over Vetropack? Criteria for Other Targets 
Zignago Vetro is the best acquisition target for 
Vidrala since it checks most criteria the company 
defined in 2015 when acquiring Encirc:
• Customer diversification
• Different Product-Mix weights
• Consolidation of the Western Europe market
• Usage of higher cullet rates due to already 
existent vertical integration
In addition, Zignago Vetro has a more complete 
product portfolio than Vidrala, adding:
• Cosmetics and Perfumery
• Specialty Glass Containers
Zigango’s presence in Italy can also be leveraged 
to improve the overall performance of the 
group’s operations in that country
Zignago’s ownership of joint ventures Vetri
Speciali and Vetreco, 50 and 30% respectively, are 
not considered since these targets are not 
strategically fit
If for any reason the acquisition of 
Zignago Vetro fails a Plan B is 
considered 
Most criteria also check for 
Vetropack however, with less 
influence in the Western Europe 
Market
Vetropack also has a larger 
product portfolio than Vidrala:
• Pharmaceutical Packaging
There are three main reasons 
to choose Zignago over 
Vetropack:
• Core Markets
Zignago Vetro has presence in a 
Western European Market 
where Vidrala is not (France)
• Potential Deal Size
Vetropack has a much larger 
EBITDA than Zignago (€ 170M 
vs € 79M) which would bring 
higher risk to the deal, albeit 
Zignago’s EBITDA is still 
relevant
• Better EBITDA margins
Zignago Vetro has already 
better margins than Vetropack
In case both deals fail it is 
important to define some 
criteria so that the deal 
succeeds:
Tier 1:





• Deal size or combined size 
of the companies acquired 
• Cullet utilization rate
• Speed of the Due 
Diligence Process
Moreover, vertical 
integration can also be 
considered in order to 
increase the cullet utilization 
rates. One example could be 
Eurovetro*, which is only, 20 
minutes away from Vidrala’s 
facilities in Italy
If the acquisition of Vetropack is 
not possible smaller acquisitions 
should be considered according to 
the established criteria
Note that probably these 
companies will not have recycled 
glass providers, and so, in this 
case vertical integration should 
also be considered




Investment Thesis | Operational Improvements
Automation and integration of big data will be the main operational improvements behind
the increase in EBITDA margin
Revenue per employee 
(in €)
• Maintain the path of automation and digitalization of the production 
process with inclusion of robotics and bid data into making the 
production process as efficient as possible
• From 2014 to 2019, the company increased the ratio of revenue per 
employee from € 251.7 to € 268.4. In the upcoming years, the companies' 
investment in R&D will be maintained and push the Vidrala Academy 
towards the goal of achieving a revenue per employee of € 295.7
• This obviously directly impacts the personnel expenses and 
consequently key performance ratios such as the EBITDA margin
• As a member of the FEVE association, Vidrala has committed to increase 
the % of cullet in its production process. This will allow the company to 
decrease the costs associated with electricity and raw materials and to 
increase the capacity of each furnace, since the duration of the melting 
process also decreases with the usage of cullet*
Sources: *Research Gate, Impact of Glass Cullet on the Consumption of Energy and Environment in the Production of Glass Packaging Material
Rate of Cullet Inclusion
• Investments are planned with the goal of increasing efficiency and 
consequently reduce the weight of the raw materials in the cost 
structure of the company. The investments in furnace upgrades promise 
to bring marginal decreases in the % of COGS relative to sales along the 
next years. At the same time, Investments in the UK & Ireland region are 
expected to push this segment of the company closer to the margins of 
the rest of the group and decrease the weight of the COGS to around 
30% of revenues
COGS as % of Revenue
Vidrala Gross Margin Vetropack Gross Margin 
2019
Zignago Vetro Gross 
Margin 2019
The efforts to include of Cullet and furnace upgrades will 
cause an increase on the gross margin of Vidrala, moving 
progressively closer to the gross margins of certain 
competitors/ targets of similar size to Vidrala
Vidrala EBITDA Margin
The continuous investment regarding the integration of 
robotics and big data in the production process will 
continue to increase the revenue per employee and will 







(excluding joint ventures) 
In order to be able to achieve these improvements, Vidrala will have to keep investing in technology. 
This way, beyond the expansion capex, the levels of capex will be 16% higher (the average for the last 
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Investment Thesis | Greenfield Development
Although the industry is going through a consolidation proccess, Romania is suited for a 
greenfield development due to its glass trade balance, market size and growth
Sources: Vidrala Annual Report, Glass International, Eurostat, IMF
The location chosen to build the new plant was
• Romania is a net importer of glass containers
• It is an Eastern European country, giving Vidrala the 
oportunity to benefit from big markets with higher 
growth rates
• Its proximity to several other countries in this region 
that Vidrala may serve as well: Moldavia, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary
• Lower labor, land and production costs








Gross PP&E per plant- Average of the current GPP&E per furnace was used. 
Although land might be cheaper in Romania, there is great uncertainty about 
other possible investments
Revenue- average revenue per furnace was used and an assumption regarding 
the number of furnaces to build was made according to the demand identified 
by the group according to the size of the market, growth rates and trade balance
Net Working Capital- Worst captions of last 4y of Vidrala were assumed as a 
starting point, with improvements taking place over the years
Employee Expenses- Calculated according to Average Hourly manufacturing 
costs in Romania (Eurostat), evolving according to inflation throughout the 





Construction of the plant will start in 
the beginning of 2021
Years until plant starts producing 
1 year
Production capacity in
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
50% 70% 100%
Millions of € 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Revenues - 53.2 85.1 109.6 113.0 117.4
Gross Profit - 27.9 50.7 76.1 79.1 82.5
Gross margin - 52.4% 59.5% 69.4% 70.0% 70.3%
EBITDA - 9.2 27.1 48.7 51.0 53.5
EBITDA Margin (%) - 17.3% 31.8% 44.4% 45.1% 45.6%
EBIT - (0,2) 17,6 39,2 41,6 44,1
EBIT Margin (%) - (0.4%) 20.7% 35.8% 38.3% 39.1%
NOPAT - (0.2) 14.8 33.0 34.9 37.0
Δ in Net Working Capital - (13.2) (7.5) (5.7) (0.2) (0.4)
CAPEX (134.6) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5)
FCF (134.6) (13.4) 7.3 27.2 34.7 36.6
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• Main source of EBITDA Margin expansion 
comes from COGS as acquiring companies 
who use more recycled glass allow for lower 
COGS and accelerate the glass production 
process
• By using a higher share of recycled glass in 
the manufacturing process, Vidrala reduces 
Electricity costs as glass takes less time in 
the furnaces to be complete
• Finally, by introducing Vidrala’s significantly 
more automated process to its target, it 
allows to reduce Employee Expenses in the 
acquired targets
Margin Uplift
• Maintenance CAPEX is expected to remain 
at historical levels, with a slight increase for 
Vidrala’s current schedule
Capex
Business Plan | Growth Forecasts Overview
The Business Plan forecasts an additional € 621M in Revenue and € 247M in EBITDA 
Values in M EUR
Top Line Bottom Line Expansion
• GDP Growth and share of Urban population 
are the main growth drivers
• Premiumization of alcoholic beverages 
increase demand for glass
Organic Growth
• Acquire an additional € 332M in 2022 in 
Europe to expand presence in Italian market 
and add exposure to the Pharmaceutical & 
Cosmetics end markets as well as other 
European Countries
• Leverage targets’ connections with cullet 
providers to increase share of recycled glass
Inorganic Growth • Investment in Net Working Capital is 
expected to follow the historical correlation 
with company growth
• Furthermore, inventory synergies are 
expected to be introduced by increasing the 
business scale. Using a conservative 
forecast of a 2.5% yoy improvement, CCC is 















2018H 2020F 2022F 2024F 2026F 2028F
Capex (excl. M&A)





















4,5x 5,5x 6,5x 7,5x 8,5x 9,5x 10,5x
Combining several valuation methodologies resulted in a multiple of 7.5x, which correspond 
to an enterprise value of € 2Bn for Vidrala
Valuation | Entry Valuation





















This method includes 
information from 8 
past transactions from 
the last 6 years, which 
were considered 
relevant for our 
valuation. However, it 
is important to stress 
that some deals’ sizes 
were smaller than the 
current one
EV/EBITDA Cycle 
This method was 
used in order to 
understand how 
the multiple has 
been evolving over 
time. For this 
purpose, the next 
twelve months 
EV/EBITDA 
multiples from the 
last 10 years were 
retrieved
LBO Valuation
The LBO method reflects 
the entry multiple that 
by considering the exit 
proceeds allows the 
fund to obtain the 
target return (20%-30%)
EV/EBITDA
Current next twelve months EV/EBITDA helps 
measuring the enterprise value of peers in 
relative terms. It does not take into 
consideration the capital structure, reflecting 
mainly the operational performance. Vidrala 
and Zignago Vetro’s multiples are way above 
the average of 7.9x (10.2x and 11.2x 
respectively). While these companies may be 
more competitive and should have an above 
the average entry multiple, it does not seem 
reasonable to assume their current trading 
multiples to enter in the project 
2nd Quartile to 
Median
Median to 3rd 
Quartile
DCF Model
For the DCF model valuation, it is 
considered Vidrala’s predicted 
free cash flows without 
synergies, a WACC of 6.5%
(Bloomberg Estimate) and a 
perpetual growth rate of 0.5%, 
which are then used for sensitivity
Share Price
The share price analysis is a 
reality check for the entry 
multiple as it reflects the 
company’s market value. To 
perform this valuation, data 











Capital Structure | Sources and Uses
Entry debt is assumed to account for 66% of the capital 
structure, representing 5.12x the EBITDA for the both firms
1
3
Uses of FundsSources of Funds








Total EV 2 585.6 96.64%






FRI 692.7 2.63x 25.9%
Ordinary Equity 63.2 0.2x 2.4%





FRI 161.9 2.04x 6.1%
Total Equity 917.8 34.3%
TOTAL SOURCES 2 672.4 7.79x 100%






Senior debt 1 054.3 5x 39.5%




Senior debt 436.7 5.5x 16.3%
Total debt 1 754.6 65.7%
Fees In million € % of Total Uses
DD Fees 25.9 1.0%
Advisory Fees 25.9 1.0%
Banking Fees 35.0 1.36%
Total Fees 86.8 3.36%
TOTAL USES 2 672.4 100%
2
4
Taking into consideration the capex requirements for 
the project and the future cash flow generation, the 
capital structure is expected to be composed by 65.7% 
of debt and 34.3% of equity (5.12x the Sum of EBITDA 
of Vidrala and Zignago). These figures show lower 
leverage when compared with deal of Apollo which 
took place in 2015
2
Vidrala is assumed to be acquired for € 1.99Bn at the 
end of 2020 and Zignago Vetro one year later for                
€ 598.6M, with the same entry multiple of 7.5x. Adding 
3.36% in fees, it results in a total investment of 
€ 2.67Bn
1
The Management Team receives ownership of 10% of 
the Ordinary Shares. For that, they pay 2x their fixed 
component of the annual salary at entry (to 
guarantee they have “skin in the game”). The 
Institutional Investors figure is computed maintaining 
the price paid per % of ownership equal to the 
management team. The Fixed Return Instrument 
accounts for the rest of the equity and has a hurdle 
rate of 10%. The second capital call is done through an 
FRI in order not to dilute the Management Team
4
Considering the entry levels of each company 
separately: Vidrala is acquired with 63.6% of Debt and 
36.4% of Equity, while Zignago Vetro is acquired with 
72% of Debt and 27% of Equity
3
15
Assuming an Exit in 2025, the Institutional Investors are expected to obtain a money   
multiple of 2.8x and an IRR of 23.6%
Returns | Exit Waterfall
Entry Proceeds Recap. Exit Proceeds
Inst. Investors
Fixed Return Instrument € 693M € 162M € 1 353M
Inst. Investor Shares € 57M € 1 189M
Returns Management
Sweet Equity € 6M € 132M
• After an Investment period of 5 years, the Exit is planned for 2025. At this point the sum of the EV and Cash adds up to € 3.9Bn
• At Exit, fees were considered lower in percentage of the Total deal since there are lower due diligence requirements, banking and advisory fees. The total amount of 
Debt which is still left to amortize from both Debt calls is close to € 1.1Bn, and there is still a total of approximately € 2.7Bn left to be distributed to the Fund and the 











7.0x   
2.19x   2.54x   2.88x   
7.5x   
2.43x   2.79x   3.14x   
8.0x











7.0x    22.7% 21.3% 19.9%
7.5x   26.0% 23.6% 21.7%
8.0x 29.1% 25.8% 23.3%
Institutional and Management Returns
Exit Waterfall (in million €)
• Management Team: The management team pays a total of € 6.3M for 10% of 
the Ordinary shares. After 5 years they are expected to receive € 132M. The 
payoff to the management team is expected to yield an IRR of 83.27% and a 
money multiple of 20.9x. The 2nd capital call to acquire Zignago (€ 162M) is 
done with a Fixed Return Instrument to avoid dilution Management team
• Institutional Investors: The institutional investors enter the deal with a total of     
€ 911M, divided into FRI ( € 855M ) and Ordinary Shares ( € 57M). At exit, the 
institutional investors are expected to get a total of € 2.5Bn, yielding a MM of 2.8x 
and an IRR of 23.6%
132
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While deleveraging is the largest contributor to the value creation, operational 
improvements have similar contribution to exit equity
Returns | Value Creation Breakdown
Revenue Growth Margin Expansion Greenfield Deleveraging
• Revenue growth value creation 
comes from market growth, 
driven by population growth, 
urbanization and premiumization
of the end markets
• Since estimates use market 
values, there is still potential for 
an increase in market share
• M&A synergies are represented in 
this category, driven by:
– Reduction in COGS by 
increase in usage of Cullet
– Increased automation and 
increasing revenue per 
employee
– Reduction of sales expense in 
overlapping markets
• € 385M is the value at exit, i.e, exit 
multiple times the exit EBITDA 
• This value is driven by better 
margins than other factories, 
mainly due to cheaper labour 
• Without the Greenfield 
development the deleveraging 
effect would be higher and there 
would be more room for leverage 
at entry
• Vidrala and Zignago Vetro’s cash 
generation ability allow for 
increased usage of leverage and 
quick repayments
• Compared to past M&A 
transactions, forecasted 
Debt/EBITDA is smaller than 










The transaction is more sensitive to the entry multiple rather than exit multiples and IRR 
decreases with the exit year
Returns | Sensitivity Analysis (I/III)
Entry Multiple








le 6.5x    3.61x   2.80x   2.29x   1.95x   1.70x   
7.0x   4.02x   3.10x   2.54x   2.16x   1.88x   
7.5x   4.42x   3.41x   2.79x   2.37x   2.06x   
8.0x   4.82x   3.72x   3.04x   2.58x   2.24x   
8.5x   5.23x   4.03x   3.29x   2.78x   2.42x   
Exit Year








le 6.5x   1.46x   1.95x   2.29x   2.63x   2.99x   
7.0x   1.67x   2.19x   2.54x   2.88x   3.26x   
7.5x   1.88x   2.43x   2.79x   3.14x   3.53x   
8.0x   2.10x   2.67x   3.04x   3.40x   3.79x   
8.5x   2.31x   2.91x   3.29x   3.66x   4.06x   
Exit Year








le 6.5x   14.2% 19.1% 18.7% 18.0% 17.4%
7.0x   19.8% 22.7% 21.3% 19.9% 18.9%
7.5x   25.0% 26.0% 23.6% 21.7% 20.2%
8.0x   29.8% 29.1% 25.8% 23.3% 21.5%
8.5x   34.3% 32.0% 27.9% 24.9% 22.7%
Entry Multiple








le 6.5x   30.2% 23.6% 18.7% 14.8% 11.7%
7.0x   33.0% 26.3% 21.3% 17.3% 14.0%
7.5x   35.7% 28.8% 23.6% 19.5% 16.2%
8.0x   38.1% 31.1% 25.8% 21.6% 18.2%
8.5x   40.4% 33.2% 27.9% 23.6% 20.1%
Fund’s Money Multiple Fund’s IRR
• Within the base case the investment shows more sensitivity to entry multiple rather than exit levels, as the same movement in the multiple creates larger impact 
when considering a movement along the entry multiple
• The later the exit takes place money multiple increases but at a lower IRR. This happens because the rate at which- operational improvements, synergies and 
revenue- grows decreases from 2024 onwards. On top of this, the greenfield development is at full scale by the end of 2024
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Revenue growth and greenfield feasibility are the most critical assumptions to evaluate on 
the Due Diligence process
Returns | Sensitivity Analysis (II/III)
Comments on the individual impact of each sensitivity analysis 
Revenue CAGR sensitivity
Revenue growth is calculated using price and volume changes which were based on drivers 
previously identified. The fact that the worst-case scenario can cause a downside IRR impact of 
4.3% makes this a key area to focus on the Due Diligence Process
Worst Case*          Base Case*          Best Case*
Revenue per Employee sensitivity 
Operational Improvements reflected in the revenue per employee are assumed to be of key 
importance to the deal. Here, the impact on the size of the growth rate (CAGR) is measured. At the 
modelled worst case, IRR would still be above the 22% which makes this assumption less distressing 
Zignago Vetro Synergies sensitivity 
This analysis is to evaluate the effect of Zignago Vetro on improving current Vidrala’s operations: 
Cost of Goods Sold in Italy and Sales Expenses. The impact on IRR is also quite significant, so this 
should also be an item to take into consideration in the Due Diligence
Greenfield operational sensitivity 
In this calculation, the impact of the efficiency levels of the Romanian factory in the first two years 
and the average revenue per furnace is measured. The intermediate change compared to base 
case indicates that the assumptions are not aggressive and most of the value is generated at exit
Due to a high EBITDA margin of 44%, a sensitivity to this value was also made to assess the 
breakeven EBITDA and EBITDA Margin. The conclusion was that for an EBITDA margin higher than 
16.5% (€ 18M in EBITDA) and everything else constant, the project begins increasing the deal’s IRR
Greenfield sensitivity 
The impact of no Greenfield development is also measured. Note that without Greenfield, the cash 
generation (deleveraging) process would be higher and so it offsets in part the importance of the 
new factory to the returns. It is a key variable to the deal, but removing it would also allow for 
more leverage at entry, increasing the “worst-case” IRR
23.6% IRR












Revenue growth assumptions are the most critical to evaluate on the Due Diligence process
Returns | Sensitivity Analysis (III/III)
Worst Case Base Case Best case
Revenue CAGR
Vidrala 1.3% 3.29% 4.79%
Iberian Peninsula 1.3% 3.21% 4.71%
UK & Ireland 1.3% 3.46% 4.96%
Italy 1.3% 3.07% 4.57%
Zignago 1.3% 3.10% 4.60%
Greenfield 1.3% 3.3% 4.79%
Revenue per Employee CAGR
Vidrala 1.4% 2.42% 2.9%
Zignago 1.4% 2.38% 2.9%
Synergies Zignago
Cogs Italy synergy 2.0% 7.0% 12.0%
Sales Expenses 0.0% 1.0% 2.0%
Greenfield Operational sensitivity
Average Revenue per Furnace € 42,565.77 € 53,207 € 58,527.93 
Number of Employees Needed 453 353 303
Efficiency Y1 90.0% 50.0% 40.0%
Efficiency Y2 70.0% 30% 10.0%
• Revenue CAGR- Base method based on our market forecast methodology. Worst created by subtracting 1% to 
historical median organic growth rates of Vidrala (~2% below Base scenario). Best Case adds 1.5% to the base case
• Revenue per employee CAGR- Base scenario based on operational capex. Worst Scenario subtracts 1% to the 
base case, best scenario adds 0.5% to the base scenario.
• Synergies Zignago- Base scenario based on potential for synergies identified in Vidrala. COGS scenarios created by 
adding and subtracting 5%. Sales expenses scenarios created by adding and subtracting 1%
• Greenfield Operational Sensitivity- Base scenario for Average Revenue per furnace and Revenue per employee 
created by using averages of Vidrala´s Balance Sheet. Efficiency scenarios created using assumptions which were 
seemed reasonable when compared with news observed















































• Both Vidrala and the main 
acquisition targets are already 
Publicly traded
• Deal size won’t cause any strain in 
taking company public
• Higher degree of uncertainty of 
returns due to being dependent on 
market conditions
• Follows trend of industry 
consolidation
• Interesting target due to high 
degree of automation from Vidrala
• Evidence of cross-continent M&A 
activity in this sector (CVC with BA 
Glass)
• Private Equity activity with highest 
dry-powder level in history ($2.5Tn)
• Attractive target with stable cash 
flows and recent greenfield 
development at exit
• Ability to partner with strategic 
buyer
• Potential due to competitive 
concentration in western Europe
• Clients may wish to vertically 
integrate some factories
• Possible red flag from competition 
authorities due to excessive 
industry concentration
• Higher difficulty to find buyers 
when compared with IPO 
• Deal size excludes many buyers, 
creating a large necessity for a club 
deal
• Negotiations can lower the 
possibility of returns derived from 
multiple arbitrage
• Loss of Synergies already present 
and obtained from acquisitions 
• Difficulty/work needed to find a 
buyer for each part 
Note: Heineken included since in a company report is mentioned to be a client both in Great Britain and in Continental Europe
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Owens-Illinois could strengthen its European position by acquiring Vidrala
Exit Strategies | O-I
Overview
• Similar product portfolio to Vidrala
• 34 out of 78 manufacturing facilities are in Europe
• Experience in making large deals (Vitro)






Historical Financials, in Million $
Product Mix Relevance
• 2019: Nueva Fábrica Nacional de Vidro. EV: $ 188M




Andres Alberto Lopez CEO 1986 (2016 CEO)
John Haudrich CFO 2009 (2019 CFO)
Giancarlo Currarino CTO/CSCO 2000 (2016)







6 702 6 869 6 877 6 691
1 115 944






2014H 2015H 2016H 2017H 2018H 2019H
Revenue EBITDA Margin
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Ardagh has done deals with the same size as forecasted exit EV
Exit Strategies | Ardagh
Overview
• Ardagh has glass and metal packaging solutions for food and beverages.
• Its glass production facilities in Europe are in Germany, Poland and Italy.
• M&A history in large deals






Historical Financials, in Million $ (2017-2019 adjusted due to discontinued operations) 
Product Mix Relevance
• 2019: Trivium Packaging – spin off




Paul Coulson CEO 1999 (2017 CEO)
David Mattews CFO 2014 (2017 CFO)
Shaun Murphy COO 2019
Sources: Ardagh Group, Bloomberg
• Beverages - metal 
• Beverages - glass
• Food - metal
• Beverages - glass
6 316 5 796
7 014
6 390 6 676 6 660







2014H 2015H 2016H 2017H 2018H 2019H
Revenue EBITDA Margin
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Based on the sensitivity analysis, market trends and Zignago Vetro are key issues for the 
Due Diligence
Area Key Aspects to Focus
Due Diligence | Commercial and Financial
RelevancePotential Issues 
Volume and Price growth 
trends 
• Analysis on the relevance of the growth drivers 
identified and on its evolution for the foreseeable 
future (5-8 years)
• Overestimation of the price evolution
• Overestimation of the volume evolution 
Customer relationship 
• Analysis of the existing customer contracts 
• Understanding of the customer behaviour trends 
regarding time to pay, size and frequency of orders
• Assumptions regarding NWC being too optimistic
• Higher NWC due to customer bargaining power
M&A target: Zignago 
Vetro
• Operational margins, product mix, cashflow 
generation, non-reported debt and synergies











• Assumed synergies impossible to meet
• Extra expenses in acquiring and/or lower exit 
EBITDA








Financial Reporting / 
Accounting
• Analysis on all reported cash flow relevant accounts
• Evaluate current operating cash management 
• Understand the reason behind the low level of debt
• Evaluate the accounts/ assumptions regarding NWC
• Vidrala’s fair value being higher/lower
• Any practice of fraud
• Non-optimal cash management practices that can 
affect the overall cashflow generation
Tax 
• Analysis on the tax breakdown through geography
• Find optimal tax structure
• Understand the environmental trends regarding tax
• Higher taxes than expected
Leases and Fixed Assets 
• Analysis on annual maintenance costs and on 
maintenance capex
• Understand the deals supporting the lease of 
equipment
• Evaluate the real operating leverage
• Higher maintenance capex than expected
• Underestimation of operating leverage that can 
bring extra risk to the deal
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Operations of the Greenfield Expansion also have a significant relevance in the DD process
Due Diligence | Operational and Legal
R&D and Automation
• Analysis on the possible implementation of projects 
regarding product development
• Understanding the trend of increasing revenue per 
employee given its current level of Capex 
• Overestimation of the revenue per employee 
growth driver
• Higher Capex costs
ERP and IT systems
• Analysis of the existing ERP systems and its 
capabilities regarding Industry 4.0
• Evaluate the target’s systems and difficulty of 
integration
• Systems needing an expensive update
• Higher integration costs
• Longer integration process
Greenfield Expansion
• Ensure that even in worse scenarios of timing and 
efficiency the project will be profitable
• Evaluate the ability to create a strong relationships 











• Since it is a new market with a different culture, 
entrance figures might differ from expectations







• Evaluate the possibility of Zignago Vetro’s
acquisition fall due to EU competition law
• Understand if Vidrala’s business practices are up to 
code




• Analysis of the impact of recent ESG regulations on 
the Business Plan
• Increasing costs to comply with new regulations
• Reputation problems that can impact revenues
Potential Litigation
• Analysis of existing debt covenants and 
restructuring possibility
• Analysis of agreements in place with unions
• Pending lawsuits
• Analysis of contracts with Customers/suppliers
• Extra financial costs
• Employee satisfaction decrease and possible strikes 
• Compliance costs
Area Key Aspects to Focus RelevancePotential Issues 
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Portuguese business environment is dominated by small companies whose owners 
and managers are low educated when compared to EU countries. In this context, 
Portuguese Private Equity firms can play a very interesting role. 
On the one hand, regarding the size a significant number of companies do not meet 
the minimum size requirements (revenue, EBITDA, etc.) to be bought by funds. 
Despite that, within the Portuguese market some companies do meet the criteria, 
giving space for some opportunities. 
On the other hand, education wise is where Portuguese GP’s can make most impact. 
By setting growth paths and leveraging on their business expertise, value should be 
added in a professional, competent and incentivized way. The focus on medium/long-
term value, the increase of highly educated management and implementation of 
monitoring measures would increase the competitiveness of the Portuguese firms.
Regarding COVID-19, during the first wave, many businesses entered in a layoff 
scheme period and recurred to a moratorium period, therefore delaying debt 
repayments. The magnitude of this impact is not yet known, but it is predictable that 
some otherwise financially sustainable firms require capitalization. Assuming PE 
funds have the availability, there could be space for interesting distressed and 
leveraged buyouts. 
Finally, the newest generations are becoming more and more educated, with 
interesting universities located in the coastal districts between Lisbon and Braga, 
which will increase the supply of educated employees both in quality and quantity in 
distinct areas from Biotechnology and Engineering to Business and Marketing. 
Individual Reflection – João Gonçalves
Individual Reflection
Potential of Sustainable Packaging for Private Equity Investments Private Equity and the Portuguese Business Context  
The process of choosing a company for this project started with creating a 
shortlist of potential companies that could be interesting LBO targets. Such 
shortlist was assembled by applying knowledge learnt in the Corporate 
Finance, Applied Corporate Finance, Financial Statement Analysis and Private 
Equity courses.
The glass packaging industry has historically shown low variation, with 
companies such as Vidrala making predictable cashflows and allowing for the 
level of debt typical of this type of investment. Notwithstanding that, 
management teams of companies within this sector are usually very 
experienced which can partly explain the continuous improvement in 
margins within the industry. 
However, in this industry it is difficult to create differentiated products, 
hence the success of potential deals, lies within customer relationships and 
operational leadership. 
Sustainability and ESG are nowadays expressions very present within the 
vocabulary of entrepreneurs, politicians and businesspeople. It means that 
businesses that are socially and environmentally friendly can have increased 
advantages against businesses that do not. These advantages can be either 
regulatory, mainly in western economies, or from consumer trends that 
privilege environmentally friendly products. 
To conclude, it is expected that in the following years and decades R&D 
investments, biotech startups and universities keep creating more 
sustainable solutions that can be scalable to create new solutions (bio 






Multiple Arbitrage can be attained due to a positive cycle or based on an historical case
Assumption: no multiple arbitrage at exit. Reasoning 1: EV/EBITDA cycle
Additional Considerations | Returns | Possibility of Multiple Arbitrage
Sources: Bloomberg, Reuters, Verallia
Reasoning 2: Verallia Case
• The base case modeled returns assumes no multiple 
arbitrage
• However, it can be possible to obtain better returns due 
to a favorable EV/EBITDA cycle at exit or by considering 
the success case Apollo had with Verallia
• Note that other factors could cause such arbitrage, for 
example ESG trends and legislation that could favor 
sustainable materials such as glass or harm plastic
• First, regarding the EV/EBITDA multiple has been subject 
to a certain cyclicality. However, there is no guarantee 
about the level of the cycle at exit. Hence, including it as 
base case would be optimistic 
• Secondly, Apollo apparently did manage to obtain a 
multiple arbitrage with Verallia. Hence, there can be a 
precedent case where the assumption could make sense. 
Nevertheless, given that the exit multiple is only an 
estimate and not a given fact it is assumed that no 
multiple arbitrage would come from this
• All in all, there could be multiple arbitrage due to several 
reasons however, none of them, neither individually nor 
collectively allows to claim it with a desirable degree of 
certainty
• EV/EBITDA trading multiples for the 
glass packaging industry have been 
increasing in the last years (average 
9.1x in the past 3 years vs 7.9x in the 
past 10 years)
• Vidrala’s trading multiple in the last 
year is slowly increasing after a 
somehow sharp decrease in the 
previous year. However, this can be 
offset given the fact that the LBO 
model considers a lower valuation 






FY-3 FY-2 FY-1 FY0
EV/EBITDA Cycle
Vidrala Last 10y average
Last 3y average Average of the others
• In 2015 the Apollo Global Management fund acquired Verallia at a 
€2 950M EV valuation implying a 7.4x multiple
• 4 years later in 2019, according to Reuters, the company was 
“hoping to fetch a multiple of between 8 and 8.5 times its core 
earnings in an IPO”
• At IPO, market capitalization was roughly €3.2Bn and Net Debt was 
€1.7Bn in April of that year and €1.6B in December 
• EBITDA at the end of the year was 615M, leading to an EV/EBITDA 
multiple of 7.80x to 7.97x (~0.5x arbitrage)
• Note that there was a yearly EBITDA increase for the whole year so 
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